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reliant on men. Importantly, they are becoming more 
economically independent and as a result their interest in 
having children with men is declining. This makes it harder 
for men to aﬃrm their masculinity as breadwinners and 
procreators. Moreover, the traditional warrior role is no 
longer widely available to men. The prevalence of military 
service has declined across most developed societies and 
even if one serves, the kind of work one will do is less likely 
to aﬃrm the traditional warrior identity. All in all, we don’t 
need breadwinners, procreators, and warriors. Nevertheless 
we still enforce the gender binary, and this leaves men 
with few ways to achieve the roles we condition them to 
serve. We have produced what Digby calls a “dangerous 
masculinity cocktail” (102). Men, in order to aﬃrm their 
masculinity, turn to alternative and increasingly destructive 
outlets. Digby’s most disturbing passages describe some 
of the forms this can take. Lifelike sex dolls, gonzo porn, 
violent and misogynistic videogames, macho sports, 
gang violence, gun culture, and mass shootings are some 
examples. 
Digby also oﬀers a theory of the origins of tragic 
heterosexuality and cultural militarism. According to 
Digby, not all societies rely on war to resolve problems 
with other societies. Such pacifistic societies do not foster 
the tragic gender binary. However, societies that rely on 
war will exhibit tragic heterosexuality. This is because the 
cultivation of tragic heterosexuality is an eﬀective means 
for a society to manage the burdens of frequent war. War-
reliant societies need a lot of people who can eﬀectively 
engage in combat, i.e., warriors, and because they will 
have members frequently killed in war, they also need to 
have proficient breeders. As it takes comparatively few 
men to maintain a high rate of reproduction, it makes sense 
to assign the role of warrior to men and the role of breeder/ 
nurturer to women. Hence, war-reliant societies find utility 
in the gender binary and tragic heterosexuality. So long as 
societies continue to be war reliant, tragic heterosexuality 
will live on. 
It is here that Digby finds reason to think we can and 
are overcoming the pull of tragic heterosexuality. Given 
the nature of what is currently the most urgent national 
security threat, i.e., the threat of terrorism, and the types 
of response it requires, the utility of warrior masculinity is 
decreasing. Thwarting terrorism is not achieved by means 
of conventional warfare. Killing terrorists is not going to 
end the threat of terrorism. In fact, a conventional military 
response will likely increase the threat of terrorism. The 
United States, for instance, has learned this slowly over 
the course of the decade and a half since 9/11. This 
discovery is evident in the changes the U.S. made in its 
counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
As a result, there is no longer the same need for warrior 
masculinity as there may have been in the past. This 
opens the door for a challenge to the gender binary. Digby 
sees evidence of the challenge underway already. An 
increased sensitivity to the needs of soldiers, an aversion 
to casualties, and the inclusion of women in combat signal 
a gradual degendering of war. 
This seems too optimistic to me. Digby may be right 
about the eﬀective ways of responding to terrorism, but 
it is not so clear how widely agreement with his view has 
spread. Given the belligerent proposals for responding 
to the Islamic State out there (Donald Trump’s suggestion 
to summarily execute members with bullets dipped in 
pig’s blood comes to mind), it seems a traditional warrior 
response to terrorism still has a lot of traction. More 
importantly, though, I am not convinced that the gender 
binary ever had the kind of social utility Digby suggests 
that it did. On Digby’s view, war reliance would seem to 
precede the gender binary and cultural militarism. But there 
is reason to see them as more intimately connected than 
this. For cultural militarism itself fosters a reliance on war. 
Culturally militaristic societies have, as Digby claims, a faith 
in masculine violence. This leads them to react to conflict 
militaristically. It wouldn’t seem to matter to such societies 
if militaristic responses to conflict in fact prolong conflict. 
Peace is not seen as a realistic goal in such societies. In 
turn, they will be war reliant and see utility in the gender 
binary even if such things are contrary to the interests of 
peace. Perhaps tragic heterosexuality, cultural militarism, 
and war reliance should be thought of as a self-reinforcing 
system of militarism that is not so easy to dislodge rather 
than as a tiered structure with war reliance at the base. 
Women in Philosophical Counseling: The 
Anima of Thought in Action 
Luisa de Paula and Peter Raabe, eds. (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2015). 322 pages. $100. ISBN: 978-0-
7391-9165-1. 
Reviewed by Nancy J. Matchett 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO,
NANCY.MATCHETT@UNCO.EDU 
Philosophers are doing quite a bit of hand-wringing about 
our discipline these days. Some of this is over the relative 
absence of female voices in the academic profession and 
some over the extent to which philosophy can or should be 
understood as a practical pursuit. Women in Philosophical 
Counseling brings these two concerns together, yet 
does not engage in or encourage more hand-wringing. 
Instead, the 18 contributors, from 13 countries, share their 
experiences of putting philosophy to practical use. 
The book, which is organized into five main parts, oﬀers 
what co-editor Luisa dePaola calls “a virtual journey in 
philosophical counseling” (5). Part I aﬀords readers the 
experience of “Listening to Whispers” from people whose 
voices are frequently overlooked: clients who are especially 
vulnerable and philosophical counselors working outside 
academia. Two of its four selections describe philosophical 
work with clients: Turkish women who “feel, and/or are, 
controlled, abused or manipulated most of the time” 
(Moryahim, 16), and terminally ill patients whose hunger for 
meaning is “great, urgent and intense” (Sesino, 52). Both 
contexts produce experiences of loneliness and isolation 
that result from external circumstances largely beyond the 
clients’ control. Hence philosophy might be thought to have 
little to oﬀer them, especially if identified with abstract 
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thinking and didactic instruction. But the attentive reader 
can hear how they learn to articulate authentic feelings 
and thoughts. Philosophical inquiry boosts self-esteem, 
enabling women in Turkey “to set clear boundaries” 
and deal with “their concrete and diﬃcult problems in 
increasingly sophisticated ways” (Moryahim, 21, 24). And 
philosophical reflection aﬀords terminally ill persons “the 
chance to experience their own identity at a deeper level” 
(Sesino, 52). Importantly, these benefits are not the result 
of top-down applications of a counselor’s preferred theory 
or method; rather, they result from exposure to “a wide 
range of philosophical perspectives and tools” (Moryahim, 
24), each of which is suggested by a counselor-as-dialog-
partner, that is, a philosopher who is not only familiar with 
a wide range of potentially relevant concepts and theories, 
but skilled at “listening to a person” (Sesino, 53). 
The specifically philosophical yet nonetheless therapeutic 
benefits of careful listening are the focus of the two other 
selections. Radovanovic—a school counselor in Serbia, 
where there is little support for mental health—suggests 
that the willingness of all therapists to explore a variety of 
diﬀerent approaches is the only way to overcome the fear 
and social prejudice of asking for help. And Bakirdjian—a 
researcher and philosophical counselor working in 
Argentina, where philosophical counseling is more 
established—stresses the importance of understanding 
each client’s primary motivation, “given that he/she is 
not merely the passive guest invited to this banquet [of 
philosophical thinking], but the main protagonist in his/her 
own recovery” (Bakirdjian, 43). 
Part II illustrates the therapeutic benefits of “Enhancing 
Doubt,” and the common theme among its four chapters 
is that “doubt is not a paralyzing state of indecisiveness or 
a diﬃculty in assessing a given state of aﬀairs, but rather 
an existential opening to the situations in which people 
find themselves from time to time” (dePaola, 284). That 
doubt can be valuable is uncontroversial to anyone with an 
interest in philosophy, yet the first two selections question 
whether doubt has been accurately conceptualized within 
the discipline. Instead of following Descartes in viewing 
doubt as a way to clear the ground for certainty, Salaverria 
contends that “doubts generate something new about us, 
about our relation to the world and thus, generate something 
new in the world itself” (69). Similarly, Amir shows how 
“humor as a tool in the practice of philosophy” makes it 
possible for women to counter the emotions of disgust 
and shame that result from “interiorizing” the association 
of women with vulnerability, bodily functions, and the like 
(83). By exploiting various ambiguities in how women (and 
especially women’s bodies) are viewed, humor shows that 
it is literally impossible to take the claims that ground those 
emotions seriously. Yet rather than demanding the ambiguity 
be resolved, humor allows us to accept—and even take 
pleasure in—human ambivalence about the body. The final 
two selections take contrasting (though not contradictory) 
positions on the value of psychological understandings of 
human nature. Gruengard draws from case studies in her 
own practice to show why she doubts that psychological 
analyses of women’s “need to be needed” are accurate 
and whether this “need” can be an authentic expression 
of women’s values (Ch. 7). Kreimer also doubts the extent 
to which people should listen to their natural or biological 
urges, though she does not doubt that they are part of us. 
Focusing specifically on “several irrational sources” that 
have been shown by empirical psychology to influence 
mate choice (121), she argues that men and women who 
visit her practice “are often ‘deceived,’ not by their partner 
but by [these] unconscious biological, psychological, and 
social factors” (128). Fortunately, philosophical counseling 
can help clients make more fulfilling relationship choices, 
not only by making these implicit urges explicit, but 
by enabling them to re-conceptualize love “as an art, as 
something we learn and improve on, not just something 
that happens to us” (121). So Kreimer’s case study, like 
Gruengard’s, serves to illustrate how doubt can facilitate 
concrete problem solving. 
The first two parts of the book emphasize how philosophical 
counseling promotes epistemic humility and opens up 
space for clients to navigate life’s problems with greater 
flexibility. Sometimes this is enough to resolve a client’s 
problems. But few life problems are the result of mistaken 
assumptions and narrow patterns of reasoning alone; 
in many cases, what is needed is a radically new way of 
conceptualizing the situations in which we find ourselves, 
even ways of re-conceptualizing ourselves. This latter, 
more constructive activity is the focus of Part III, “Thinking 
Emotions,” which is really about overcoming dualisms of 
all kinds. Interestingly, both contributors are from Norway, 
where philosophical counseling is quite well-established, 
and neither is a model of humility in its traditionally female 
guise. Vahl not only challenges the historical assumption 
that emotions should be subservient to reason, but asks 
“when is our reasoning rational? When are our inferences 
rational? When is the use of logic rational? And which 
emotions are involved in these processes in order for them 
to be rational?” (139) She also draws freely from work in 
the social sciences in order to formulate her answers— 
we are rational “when our cognitive functions work 
appropriately with our emotional functions,” and respect 
and empathy are essential to “integrating or finding a good 
balance between emotions and cognition” (ibid.)—thereby 
challenging the supposed distinction between philosophy 
and other disciplines too. In a similar vein, Angeltun 
draws on both Martin Heidegger and Carol Gilligan while 
defending phronesis as the core of all philosophical work. 
“To engage a world ‘phronetically’ is . . . an attempt to 
understand its possibilities for relations and action as it 
‘happens’” (152) and “depends on a process involving 
feelings and rationality” (154). Moreover, since caring is 
a basic structure of being-in-the-world, “it is important 
to pay attention to the psychological tensions and the 
implications which follow when emotions and actions are 
at odds” (155). Like Vahl, Angeltun forcefully challenges 
the picture of philosophy as objective theorizing that must 
be detached from basic human longings and day-to-day 
concerns. And she defends the work of philosophical 
counselors as people who “train to develop context 
sensitivity and to really listen and investigate the guests’ 
[aka clients’] experienced situations, moral dilemmas, 
relationships, feelings, and thoughts. From this context 
sensitivity we search for relevant philosophical thoughts 
from our educational background that can shed some light 
or challenge the guests’ perspectives” (Angeltun, 154). 
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The upshot of Parts I–III is that philosophical counselors (as 
a group) are just like academic philosophers (as a group) in 
terms of sensitivity to philosophical problems, knowledge 
of prior philosophical theorizing, and skill in theory-
construction. Where they diﬀer is in their interest in problems 
that emerge from clients’ own experiences, willingness to 
allow clients to “co-construct” philosophical responses 
through dialog, and conception of philosophical problems 
as being solved only when clients are able “to think their 
emotions and feel their thoughts” (dePaola, 288–89). The 
rest of the the book highlights these diﬀerences from two 
diﬀerent angles: “Sharing Insights” about how philosophical 
counseling leads to growth and new ideas, for both clients 
and counselors, and hence is continuous with academic or 
scholarly pursuits (Part IV), and detailing how philosophical 
counselors are “Acting to Change” current paradigms of 
both clinical psychology and psychiatry (Part V). Five of the 
eight contributors work primarily as counselors, the other 
three as academics. The academics are especially critical of 
philosophical paradigms that favor a particular account of 
a problem rather than emphasizing the more general need 
for coherence. After all, while “we may never actually finish 
the project of producing such an account, . . . the activity of 
its production, no matter how large or how small a portion 
of our waking life it consumes . . . is crucial to a satisfying 
human life” (Piety, 213). And the counselors are particularly 
keen to show how gender inequality and skepticism about 
philosophical counseling arise in any context where “the 
neutral posture, the objective viewpoint of the knower—the 
non-situated, distanced standpoint—is valued higher than 
the particular standpoint of the situated viewer who works 
‘in the field’ and who obtains philosophical insight through 
communication and interpersonal dialogue” (Moors, 234). 
The combined result is a persuasive case that “while there 
is nothing wrong with the pursuit of abstract or productive 
knowledge, . . . there is something wrong when it is out 
of balance with our concern and responsibility for others” 
(Douglas, 276). 
The book, which merits attention from anyone with an 
interest in the nature and value of philosophy, also serves 
as “a point of departure for engaging philosophical 
counselors with the question of diﬀérance” (dePaola, 3). 
Readers are engaged with this question from the earliest 
pages, since each co-editor takes a slightly diﬀerent stance 
in their individually written introductions. According to
Raabe, “[t]here is no doubt that women and men are equal. 
. . . But being equal doesn’t mean being the same” (1). 
Still, both psychological research and his own counseling 
experience convince him that “it’s sometimes acceptable 
to generalize” (ibid.)—namely, when doing so enables the 
counselor to more accurately discern how a client initially 
perceives his or her problems and hence to respond 
more directly to each client’s most immediate needs. 
While equally keen to facilitate genuine dialog, dePaola 
is more wary of what generalizations may obscure. This 
is grounded in her experience of being “taught”—though 
never explicitly—that women were not philosophers. 
dePaola’s main objection is to a “one size fits all model” 
of philosophy (5), and Raabe is keen to point out that 
biological diﬀerences are “not always as clear and distinct 
as social convention would have us believe” (Raabe, 2). 
Not surprisingly, the book they have put together shows 
contributors grappling with the question of diﬀerence in 
myriad ways. 
The editors also have a more political goal “to encourage 
every reader to invest in and capitalize on philosophical 
resources as they seek out and develop their uniquely 
diﬀerent way of life” (dePaola, 5). To my mind, this is 
admirably achieved. Each essay serves to illustrate a 
particular author’s “uniquely diﬀerent” approach to doing 
philosophy, and many show how a philosophical approach 
to counseling enables clients to live happier, more 
thoughtful, and more productive lives. Collectively, the 
essays demonstrate that The Anima of Thought in Action
has much greater philosophical import than those who 
ignore or seek to abstract from human vulnerability, bodily 
experience, emotional responsiveness, and interpersonal 
engagement have typically acknowledged or been willing 
to accept. And they also show that by engaging with 
concrete human problems, we can achieve that measure 
of transcendence that has long been one of philosophy’s 
most cherished aims. 
Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not 
Being Heard 
Jill Stauﬀer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
240 pages. Hardcover, $55. ISBN: 0231171501. 
Reviewed by Grayson Hunt 
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY GRAYSON.HUNT@WKU.EDU 
Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard is a small 
book with immense breadth and insight into the diﬃculties 
of and harms incurred through the process of political 
reconciliation in the aftermath of atrocity. Stauﬀer’s book 
is part of a growing philosophical literature on transitional 
justice by feminist theorists.1 While much of the research 
in this discipline is informed by legal and political theory, 
Stauﬀer’s approach to reconciliation is decidedly ethical and 
interdisciplinary. Her focus on Levinasian phenomenology 
and existentialism is paired with a serious engagement 
with empirical research about the eﬃcacy and outcomes 
of criminal and testimonial approaches to reconciliation. 
The result is a work of moral theory that, with its emphasis 
on responsiveness and intersubjectivity, oﬀers a decidedly 
feminist approach to justice. 
Stauﬀer’s work extends other conversations within European 
philosophy and holocaust studies with her engagement 
with two central figures, both victims of the Jewish 
Holocaust. I say victims because although both survived 
(Levinas was a prisoner of war; Améry was tortured and held 
at work camps at Auschwitz), there is a real sense in which 
Améry in particular did not survive; he experienced what 
many call a “social death” before his suicide in 1978. This 
insight is key to Stauﬀer’s argument; Améry’s social death 
is a feature of having been abandoned. Ethical Loneliness
oﬀers a careful meditation on a basic social abandonment 
that is often at the heart of (and yet unarticulated in) other 
works on transitional justice. Stauﬀer’s work also engages 
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